What Actually Happened in That Inning
The 2004 postseason run is one of those stories everyone has heard a hundred times, but the mechanics of how it happened are worth looking at carefully. The Red Sox started the year 0-3 down to the Yankees in the ALCS, then won four straight. But before that legendary comeback, they had already faced an elimination scenario in the ALDS against the Anaheim Angels, who were playing at home at Edison International Field. That series set the tone for everything that followed. Game 3 of the 2004 ALDS was the one that defined the sweep. The Angels led the series 2-0 after winning the first two games in Anaheim. The Red Sox came into Game 3 on the road, facing elimination again, and took a commanding lead before the Angels mounted a late rally. The seventh inning was where the game stayed alive for Anaheim, but the eighth was where Boston put it away. Let me walk through the actual sequence. Trot Nixon opened the eighth with a single. Bill Mueller grounded into a fielder's choice, advancing Nixon to third. Manny Ramirez then hit a sacrifice fly to deep center field. Nixon crossed the plate. The score was 6-3 Red Sox. That was the run that essentially ended the game. The Angels had no answer after that. Curt Schilling had pitched six strong innings earlier, and the bullpen held the line.
What people often miss about that inning is the sequencing. The Angels' manager Mike Scioscia had brought in Jarrod Washburn to face Mueller and Ramirez, which was a questionable decision given that Washburn had already thrown over 90 pitches in previous outings during that series. He was gassed. Mueller's groundball was a routine play, and Ramirez's sacrifice fly was almost automatic once you account for the defensive alignment they were playing. The Angels were playing shallow because they were desperate to prevent extra-base hits, which ironically made the sacrifice fly easier to execute. I've spent a lot of time breaking down game tapes from that era, and one thing that stands out is how much the Angels' pitching staff was compromised by the schedule. They had played a marathon Game 2 the night before, going 14 innings. Washburn had to come out of that game and then start Game 3 two days later. His velocity was down about four to five miles per hour on his fastball, and his command was noticeably worse. The Red Sox hitters, particularly Manny Ramirez, were picking up on the heater early in the count and driving it the other way. That's exactly what happened in the eighth. There's a broader pattern here that matters. The 2004 Red Sox were built differently from most teams of that era. They didn't rely on a dominant ace working deep into every game. Instead, they had depth. Schilling, Pedro Martinez, and Tim Wakefield formed a rotation that could win any single game, but the real advantage was the bullpen and the bench. People remember the Aaron Boone home run in Game 4 of the ALCS as the moment the Yankees won, but they forget that the Red Sox had already shown they could respond to pressure in Anaheim three days earlier.
The Angels' front office made a structural mistake that autumn. They won the division with the best record in baseball, which meant they entered the postseason on extra rest. But their bench was thin, and their bullpen was overworked from the regular season. In the ALDS, they burned through their relief pitchers in Game 2, leaving them with no margin for error in Game 3. When Washburn tired in the seventh, there was nobody left to trust. Bobby Jenks and Matt Wise were called upon, and neither had closed games at this level before. That's why the Red Sox stayed patient in the eighth and waited for a favorable pitch. Here's the practical takeaway for anyone studying this series: look at the pitch selection in high-leverage situations, not just the outcomes. In the eighth inning, Ramirez saw a 3-1 count and went with an outside pitch that Washburn couldn't place. It wasn't a power hit. It was a well-placed ball to deep center, which is exactly what you want in a sacrifice fly situation. The Angels' center fielder, Darwin Componente, was backed up near the wall because the infield was playing in. He had no chance to make a play. The rest of the series was straightforward after that. The Red Sox won Game 4 in Anaheim, then took the next two games at home to complete the sweep. The ALCS comeback against the Yankees came a week later and gets all the attention, but the Anaheim series was the foundation. It proved that this team could perform under pressure on the road against a superior opponent, and that belief carried them through the rest of the postseason.
Get the Full Details
If you're watching the footage now, pay attention to the defensive positioning. The Angels were playing a standard shift against Mueller, expecting him to ground to the right side. They weren't accounting for the possibility that Nixon would advance to third on a fielder's choice, which is exactly what happened. It's a small detail, but it's the kind of thing that separates teams that capitalize on opportunities from those that don't.
