Where to Find the Investigation Materials
The official Dutch Safety Board (DSB) report on the Turkish Airlines Flight 1951 crash is available as a free PDF on their website. Search for "DSB report Turkish Airlines 737 2009" and you will land on the right page within two searches. The full document runs about 200 pages. There is also a shortened summary version if you want the highlights without digging through appendices. The Imayday episode covering this crash is titled something along the lines of "Crash Course: Landing at Schiphol" or "Deadly Descent." It aired around 2010-2011 in various markets. You can find it on YouTube under the show's official channel or on the Discovery/streaming platforms that carry Mayday programming. The episode runs approximately 44 minutes. It combines reconstructed cockpit voice recorder audio, interview clips with the Dutch Safety Board investigators, and computer-generated flight path visualization. It is not a primary source document but it is useful for understanding the sequence of events if you are new to this case. On February 25, 2009, Turkish Airlines Flight 1951, a Boeing 737-8F7 registered TC-JGV, was approaching Amsterdam Schiphol Airport from Istanbul. The aircraft was 14 years old at the time of the accident. The crew was on a visual approach to runway 18R in poor weather conditions. Visibility was reported at 8 kilometers with broken clouds at 800 feet and overcast at 3,000 feet. Wind was from 190 degrees at 10 knots with gusts to 18 knots.
The left side radio altimeter failed approximately 75 seconds before impact. The right radio altimeter continued functioning normally. This asymmetry is important because the captain, who was flying, relied on his primary altitude reference. When he requested the co-pilot read out the altitude, the co-pilot was looking at the captain's display, which showed the failed left-side reading. The co-pilot called out 360 feet when the aircraft was actually at roughly that altitude but the display had already frozen or dropped to incorrect values. The aircraft impacted the ground at approximately 15:54 local time. It struck agricultural land in the polder area between Schiphol and Haarlemmermeer, burst into flames, and came to rest against a dike. Nine of the 135 people on board died. 126 survived with varying injuries. The aircraft was substantially damaged but the hull was largely intact, which meant the flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder were recovered in usable condition.
Key Investigation Findings
The Dutch Safety Board identified the probable cause as the crew's decision to continue the approach below the minimum descent altitude without maintaining visual reference to the runway environment. They did not execute a missed approach when they should have. Several factors contributed to this: The radio altimeter failure on the captain's side created a situation where the autopilot, which was engaged in approach mode, disconnected at about 110 feet radio altitude. The autothrottles also went to idle around the same time. The crew then manually continued descending through what should have been a go-around decision point. The captain was flying the aircraft. The co-pilot was the pilot monitoring. Standard crew resource management breaks down when the pilot monitoring is looking at the wrong display or providing incorrect callouts. There was also a factor related to Boeing 737 design. The radio altimeters on this aircraft type display on both the captain and first officer instruments but the cross-side indication can create confusion during asymmetrical failures. This is a known issue that post-accident modifications addressed in later 737NG production. The DSB report covers this in detail in the technical section.
Get the Full Details
The weather at the time was marginal but not below published minimums for a visual approach. The real problem was not the weather itself. It was the crew's continued descent after losing reliable altitude reference and their failure to recognize they were below the safe minimum for that phase of flight. The decision to stay on approach rather than transition to an instrument approach procedure or execute a go-around was the critical error.
How to Access the Flight Data Recorder Details
The FDR data is included in the DSB report as tabular format and graphical plots. It shows throttle lever positions, autopilot status, radio altitude from both left and right sensors, ground speed, vertical speed, and configuration settings. The data is presented in 1-second resolution for the final two minutes of flight. If you are studying this for operational purposes, focus on the period from 1600 feet radio altitude downward. That is where the sequence becomes critical. The autothrottles remained active until about 110 feet. After that the crew was managing thrust manually without the normal automation envelope. The CVR transcript is also reproduced in the report. It captures the radio altimeter callouts, the autopilot disconnect warnings, and the final exchange between the pilots. The co-pilot said "altitude" at around 60 feet and the captain responded something close to "wait" or "hold." The exact transcript wording varies slightly between sources depending on transcription conventions. The DSB version is the most authoritative.
What This Means for Operational Safety
The crash led to several regulatory changes. EASA issued an airworthiness directive affecting certain Boeing 737-800 aircraft regarding radio altimeter system configuration and cross-side display indication. The Dutch Safety Board recommended that airlines reinforce stabilized approach criteria and go-around discipline. Several carriers updated their training programs to emphasize what happens when altitude reference is lost during the final segment of an approach. For operators flying similar aircraft, the practical takeaway is straightforward. When one radio altimeter fails during approach, the remaining functional sensor still provides valid data. The key is ensuring the pilot monitoring is reading the correct display and calling out the correct value. Cross-checking between instruments during asymmetrical failures is something that should be drilled in simulator training, not learned during an actual approach in deteriorating conditions. The Imayday episode covers all of this in compressed form. The DSB report has everything. If you want to understand what happened on that flight, start with the official report and use the episode as supplementary context rather than a primary reference. The investigation documents are public domain and freely available. No subscription required.
